

Robust and Efficient Machine Learning for Mission-Critical Applications

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AI at LLNL/DOE


Cyber-Physical Security



Power Grid



Healthcare




Faulty and slow decisions can risk human safety or incur significant cost
(experimental resources or lost opportunities)

Existing AI techniques are quite brittle

- **Red AI:** Designing an input, which seems normal for a human but is wrongly classified by ML models
 - Applicable to **images, text, graphs**, etc.
 - **Spam filtering, malware detection, intrusion detection**, etc.
- Demos:
 - [Attacking an image classification system](#)
 - [Attacking a text-based search system](#)

LLNL's Red AI: digital to physical world


- Our **Red AI team** has developed real-time physical world attack to gauge model vulnerabilities
- Our attack algorithm uses a **light-projector** to fool machine learning based video surveillance systems
 - Applicable to any predictive model, e.g., deep neural nets, random forest, rule-based systems
 - Does not require complete access to the model, i.e., can attack ML as a service system
 - Extends to other modalities, e.g., natural language processing systems



Light projection attack demo

Attacking real-world Yolo-v5 detector running on Nvidia Xavier chip using MIPI camera feed (attacker does not need access to detection system)

- Make coffee cup **invisible** to the detector
- Fooling Yolo-v5 to **incorrectly** detect cup as a **scissor**



Existing validation approaches give false sense of security

- Common robustness evaluation practice is to **train a system on a training data set**, and then **test it on another set**



- This is **insufficient to provide security guarantees** as an attacker/nature can send inputs that differ from the test set
- Almost all the **heuristic defenses** have been **“broken”** soon after they were proposed

Defense	Accuracy
Buckman et al. (2018)	0%*
Ma et al. (2018)	5%
Guo et al. (2018)	0%*
Dhillon et al. (2018)	0%
Xie et al. (2018)	0%*
Song et al. (2018)	9%*

Is AI/ML useless for high-regret applications?

- Can we ever design deep neural networks (DNNs) that cannot be fooled with **certain known unknown** attacks or **guarantee predictable behavior** to achieve safe operation in many real-world applications?
- This might appear impossible given the following popular beliefs
 - Deep Learning is a black-box
 - No one knows why and how Deep Learning works
 - There are no guarantees with Deep Learning

Foolproof/Certified ML

Yet Another AI Snake Oil?



LLNL's Foolproof AI: formal verification and provably robust design

Our **Blue AI team** has developed **automated tools** to make ML systems **foolproof**

- guarantee a self-driving car will always stop on a stop sign
- **Provable robustness analysis** on any neural network structures (**Verification**)
- Differentiability and ease of use of our framework allow us to **train foolproof ML** (**Design**)



“Nothing is more useless than theory and guarantees that do not hold in practice”
-- Unknown

But how does it work?

Foolproof defense relies on our ability to “verify the robustness” of a given DNN

- Using formal methods to rigorously prove that certain properties hold
- Want to ensure: for a given input \bar{x}_0 and a given amount of noise δ , classification remains the same
- $P(\bar{x})$:
 - $\|\bar{x} - \bar{x}_0\|_{L_\infty} \leq \delta$
 - Equivalent to: $\bigwedge_i (-\delta \leq \bar{x}[i] - \bar{x}_0[i] \leq \delta)$
- $Q(\bar{y})$:
 - $\bigvee_i (\bar{y}[i_0] \leq \bar{y}[i])$, where $\bar{y}[i_0]$ is the desired label

Our Magic Sauce: relaxation based formal verification

We employ **linear relaxation techniques** to **compute provable linear bounds** on DNN output

- obtain linear relaxations of any non-linear units
- “glue” these relaxations according to the network structure (or a compute graph)




**ML
Safety
Toolbox**

**Statistics
Optimization
Software Eng.**




1. Calculate A and b by Eq. (6)
2. Visited node: $d = d - 1$



Foolproof AI by design

These bounds can be combined with training to design provably robust DNNs


- ensure that the **whole bounding box is classified correctly**



What are we able to achieve?


Foolproof for adversarial shifts

- Imperceptible Perturbations
- Geometric Perturbations
- Any shift that can be modelled (e.g., simple natural shifts, logic tables)




Foolproof for common corruptions

- Complex natural shifts
- Shifts in scientific domains



Provably enforcing certain application specifications

- Unmanned airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS-Xu)



We can achieve certified accuracy

- Certified robustness on complicated networks that **could not be supported by prior work**
- Certified defense on ImageNet where **previous approaches could not scale**

Robust Vision Models with l_∞ attack

Dataset	DenseNet	W-ResNet	ResNeXt
CIFAR10	32.43%	32.23%	31.75%
ImageNet	14.56%	15.86%	13.05%


Robust NLP Models with substitution attack

Model	2-word	4-word	6-word
LSTM	23.4%	23.4%	23.4%
Transformer	22.6%	22.6%	22.6%


These numbers imply that an **adversary cannot fool** these many test samples **regardless of the amount of compute** it throws at any adversarial example generation algorithm

Cutting-edge science to real-world impact on safety-critical applications

- **Winner of International Verification of Neural Networks Competition (VNN-COMP 2022)** α, β -CROWN is built upon our AutoLiRPA technique
- The goal of the competition is to compare neural network verification methods, in terms of **scalability and runtime speed**
 - standard formats (ONNX for NNs and VNNLIB for specifications), hardware (AWS)
- In addition, to verifying standard vision benchmarks (CIFAR classifiers), α, β -CROWN performed the best on
 - **ACAS-XU airborne collision avoidance benchmark**
 - **AFRL ACT3's SafeRL benchmark for aircraft rejoin**





Existing DNNs are not suitable for real-time and resource-limited applications



- First positive result on designing CARDS
 - Compact – small in size (reduction from 1gb to <1mb) and latency (reduction from 100ms to <1ms)
 - Accurate – state-of-the-art accuracy
 - Robust – graceful degradation
 - Deep Neural Nets
- Our tools are not image specific and apply to text/tabular modality

A new paradigm for learning efficient DNNs

We proposed a new paradigm for learning neural networks – instead of iteratively weight-training, we simply prune and binarize weights (Multi-Prize Tickets (MPT))




- MPTs result in $\sim 32\times$ memory saving and $\sim 58\times$ computation saving
- Top model in RobustBench leaderboard


We have developed a RF-ML system that is $\sim 500x$ smaller and $\sim 50x$ faster

- Application to radio frequency ML system
 - Develop a signature detection and classification system for Army tactical vehicles, to reduce cognitive burden on Army signals analysts

500x smaller, 50x faster



500x smaller, 2x faster





6% better top accuracy

Better robustness at all SNRs
(20db dense = 0db MPT)

- Developing low-power hardware AI chip for real-world demonstration (100x energy gains)

Characterization on edge devices

- We characterize the test-time adaptation performance of standard neural nets on corrupted CIFAR-10 at edge devices
 - **FPGA, Raspberry-Pi, and Nvidia Xavier NX**
- Our characterization provided some very interesting results
 - Approach that only updates the normalization parameters with Wide-ResNet, running on Xavier GPU, to be overall effective in terms of balancing multiple cost metrics
 - However, the adaptation overhead is extremely high (around 213 ms)
- **Our results strongly motivate the need for algorithm-hardware co-design for efficient on-device DNN adaptation**



A1: RXT-AM-200 + BN-Opt + NX-CPU
A2: RXT-AM-200 + BN-Opt + RPi
A3: WRN-AM-50 + BN-Norm + NX-GPU

Fig. 12: Overall results with all the points from Figs. 5, 8, 11. A1/A2: when accuracy is the only priority, A1 shows the lowest runtime and A2 the lowest energy (i.e. among all points with 10.15% error). A3: optimal point when all three costs are equally important (0.31s, 2.96J, 15.21%).


Takeaways from this talk

- Deep learning in real-world systems is **probably here to stay**
- It is possible to verify important properties of DNNs and **design Foolproof AI**
- It is possible to **achieve efficiency and performance simultaneously**

Ongoing efforts for ensuring that AI systems in the real world do the “right thing”

- **Broadening** the scope of the adversary
- **Efficient training and inference** schemes for LLMs/VLMs
- **Co-design for efficient AI**

LLNL's Mission-Critical AI



We can develop predictable, assured, and efficient ML systems

- ML verification tools to formally prove that models are robust to a range of attacks
- Assured design tools to train ML models that are accurate as well as specification consistent
- ML compression tools to design ultra compact neural nets and low power AI chips
- We can support a range of mission-critical applications (vision, NLP, tabular, etc.)



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